Bound waiting without inventing security
06If the ending marker never arrives, an implementation may choose a local stale-retention limit. That operational choice does not make route information authentic.
Start/end boundaries help reconcile received state, while peer security and route authorization remain separate. The extension adds no route-ownership proof.
Source for this drawing: RFC 7313 · Read RFC section 4 ↗
New to this? Start hereA quick picture + helpful background
A message needs an address.
Think of a packet as a small addressed envelope. Devices pass it onward; transport protocols decide what delivery promises an application gets.
Helpful first, if these ideas are unfamiliar
These pictures are analogies to help you learn. The linked RFC explains the actual rules.
Terms in this drawing
Related RFCs and changes
“Updates” changes part of an earlier RFC. “Obsoletes” replaces it. This list shows selected related documents.
An implementation MAY impose a locally configurable upper bound on stale retention and MAY remove matching stale routes when that bound is reached without waiting for EoRR. No universal timeout value is specified.
- An implementation MAY impose a locally configurable upper bound on stale retention and MAY remove matching stale routes when that bound is reached without waiting for EoRR. No universal timeout value is specified.
- A receiver MAY ignore an EoRR without an associated BoRR, and MAY log it. This example chooses to ignore it; do not turn that choice into a mandatory rejection rule.
- A received valid EoRR with an associated BoRR still requires immediate matching stale-route removal. Optional timeout cleanup and required EoRR cleanup are separate paths.
- Section7 says the extension does not significantly change Route Refresh’s underlying security issues. Boundary markers and length checks do not authenticate a peer or prove that a route is authorized.
RFC7313 §§4,7. Time and route values are illustrative; optional choices are labelled. The page is a teaching model, not a production BGP/security implementation.
Read the RFC section ↗