Respect transport and resource boundaries
05The option applies to a TCP session. UDP handling, intermediaries, routing changes and abusive clients limit how much persistence can be expected.
In a separate abusive-connection example, the server immediately closes C1 and releases its state. A previous timeout advertisement does not compel it to retain the connection.
Source for this drawing: RFC 7828 · Read RFC section 3.2.1 ↗
New to this? Start hereA quick picture + helpful background
A message needs an address.
Think of a packet as a small addressed envelope. Devices pass it onward; transport protocols decide what delivery promises an application gets.
Helpful first, if these ideas are unfamiliar
These pictures are analogies to help you learn. The linked RFC explains the actual rules.
Terms in this drawing
Related RFCs and changes
“Updates” changes part of an earlier RFC. “Obsoletes” replaces it. This list shows selected related documents.
Interpret the signal within its connection and transport.
- Clients MUST NOT include this option in UDP queries. A server receiving it in a UDP query and a client receiving it in a UDP response MUST ignore the option.
- TCP-terminating DNS intermediaries are RECOMMENDED to implement the option. Each terminated connection needs its own handling; anycast routing changes may still disrupt a longer-lived session.
- A fallback strategy like RFC 6891 §6.2.2 SHOULD address paths that interfere with EDNS. Required security functionality must be preserved. When abusive behavior is detected, the server SHOULD immediately close the connection and free its resources.
The examples use ordinary DNS TCP sessions. RFC 8490 §7.1.2 is related guidance, not a metadata Updates relationship: a DSO-capable client/server pair MUST NOT use this option after DSO (DNS Stateful Operations) session establishment. A client sending a DSO establishment message MUST stop using it from that point; receiving it after establishment is a fatal error requiring immediate abort. Plain TCP and this timeout signal add no DNS confidentiality or authentication. No intermediary, anycast or DSO implementation is simulated.
Read the RFC section ↗