Visual RFC.
ALL RFCs / RFC 8188
Read the RFC ↗
RFC 8188 / ENCRYPTED CONTENT

Keep content encrypted in storage

01

HTTP content coding transforms the message body. aes128gcm keeps content encrypted after a network connection ends; a recipient needs separately acquired keying material.

RFC 8188 · § 1EXAMPLE
4 / 4
Keep content encrypted in storageHTTP content coding transforms the message body. aes128gcm keeps content encrypted after a network connection ends; a recipient needs separately acquired keying material. Every holder of the content-encryption key can create valid encrypted content. A successful tag check is not a digital signature by a unique sender, and does not authorize writes to a storage service.Protect a body beyond the connectionRecipient ARecipient BBoth can create valid encrypted dataShared-key check ≠ individual signatureStorage write authorization is separateRFC8188 · chapter1 · state4 · published/illustrative data
04
Distinguish shared-key integrity from identity

Every holder of the content-encryption key can create valid encrypted content. A successful tag check is not a digital signature by a unique sender, and does not authorize writes to a storage service.

Source for this drawing: RFC 8188 · Read RFC section 1 ↗

Protocol participantThreat or exceptionProtocol controlSimplified drawings · precise section references
New to this? Start hereA quick picture + helpful background

A message needs an address.

Think of a packet as a small addressed envelope. Devices pass it onward; transport protocols decide what delivery promises an application gets.

Helpful first, if these ideas are unfamiliar

These pictures are analogies to help you learn. The linked RFC explains the actual rules.

Related RFCs and changes

“Updates” changes part of an earlier RFC. “Obsoletes” replaces it. This list shows selected related documents.

What changed
TLS connection protectionRFC 8188 content coding

Payload encryption complements TLS and can protect stored copies from a service without the key. It does not define key management or encrypt ordinary HTTP fields.

Read the updated RFC section ↗
KEY POINT

TLS protects a connection. Payload encryption can also protect copies stored or forwarded by a service that does not know the key; it complements TLS.

  • TLS protects a connection. Payload encryption can also protect copies stored or forwarded by a service that does not know the key; it complements TLS.
  • AES-GCM means Advanced Encryption Standard in Galois/Counter Mode. It encrypts data and adds an authentication tag; its content-encryption key is 128 bits.
  • Key management is outside this RFC. A valid tag identifies possession of the shared content-encryption key, not one individual sender. Storage write authentication and authorization remain separate.
  • Accept-Encoding can negotiate this fixed coding. Other cryptographic algorithm choices require a different content-coding scheme, not an aes128gcm algorithm parameter.
DETAILS

Published test keys are examples, not secrets to use. This guide does not implement key management or a production cryptographic library.

Read the RFC section ↗

All chapters in RFC 8188

Drawing view

Scroll the drawing to see every part. Playback controls stay above it.

RFC 9700 / CHAPTERS

Chapters

For full details, tables, algorithms, and exceptions, read the original RFC.

RFC status and corrections ↗