Visual RFC.
ALL RFCs / RFC 8288
Read the RFC ↗
RFC 8288 / WEB LINKING

Evaluate claims before trusting or following

06

A valid Link field is still an assertion. Decide whether its publisher can speak for its context and whether following its target is appropriate.

RFC 8288 · § 5EXAMPLE
3 / 3
Evaluate claims before trusting or followingAn untrusted publisher claims copyright terms for another authority through anchor. A chosen application trust policy rejects that unsupported assertion. A separate automatic-follow check blocks a GET to the untrusted target before any request, cookies or Referer is sent. Valid syntax and HTTPS do not grant third-party authority or permission to fetch.A well-formed link is still a claimPublisher: https://untrusted.example/reportSeparate follow decision: untrusted.example/termsChosen application policy blocks an automatic GETApplicationTarget serverautomatic fetch blockedNo GET, cookies or Referer sent in this caseHTTPS protects transport; it does not validate every assertion
03
Stop an automatic fetch that policy does not allow.

In a separate follow decision the target is untrusted.example/terms. This application does not allow the automatic GET, so no request, cookies or Referer is sent. HTTPS alone would not make the decision safe.

Source for this drawing: RFC 8288 · Read RFC section 5 ↗

Protocol participantThreat or exceptionProtocol controlSimplified drawings · precise section references
New to this? Start hereA quick picture + helpful background

A message needs an address.

Think of a packet as a small addressed envelope. Devices pass it onward; transport protocols decide what delivery promises an application gets.

Helpful first, if these ideas are unfamiliar

These pictures are analogies to help you learn. The linked RFC explains the actual rules.

Terms in this drawing
Dereference
Access a resource identified by a URI.
Authority
The host/port part of a URI; sharing one can be relevant to a chosen trust policy.
Related RFCs and changes

“Updates” changes part of an earlier RFC. “Obsoletes” replaces it. This list shows selected related documents.

KEY POINT

Link fields are not inherently private, integrity-protected or trustworthy. HTTPS protects transport; it does not prove the publisher’s assertions about another resource.

  • Link fields are not inherently private, integrity-protected or trustworthy. HTTPS protects transport; it does not prove the publisher’s assertions about another resource.
  • A third-party anchor assertion cannot simply be trusted. An application can mitigate this by discarding it unless an appropriate relationship between resources is established, for example a shared authority.
  • Automatic dereferencing can expose state through Referer and cookies. Applications ought to define careful follow, credential and privacy policies; parsing does not authorize a request.
  • Extension-relation documentation is not automatically fetched (SHOULD NOT). A link does not grant permission, promise availability or prove that the target’s contents are safe.
DETAILS

Fictional response from https://untrusted.example/report claims copyright terms for https://trusted.example/book by using anchor. This example application requires a recognized relationship before trusting a third-party context claim; its check fails. That is a chosen policy, not a universal same-origin MUST in RFC 8288. The last step is a separate automatic-follow policy check: no GET, cookies or Referer is sent when the application blocks following.

Read the RFC section ↗

All chapters in RFC 8288

Drawing view

Scroll the drawing to see every part. Playback controls stay above it.

RFC 9700 / CHAPTERS

Chapters

For full details, tables, algorithms, and exceptions, read the original RFC.

RFC status and corrections ↗