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RFC 9207 / AUTHORIZATION RESPONSE ISSUER

Keep identities and protections distinct

05

Unique server identities and consistent issuer signals matter, while a plain parameter supplies no signature.

RFC 9207 · § 4EXAMPLE
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Keep identities and protections distinctDistinct mechanisms: duplicate accepted issuer for two configured servers fails uniqueness; authorization-endpoint ID Token issuer disagreeing with response iss fails consistency; plain iss shown as readable unsigned text provides issuer correlation but no cryptographic integrity. Suitable validated alternatives can convey issuer without an extra parameter; full token validation outside scope.Identity correlation has a precise boundaryiss=https%3A%2F%2Fas.example%2FtenantPlain parameterNo signature hereIssuer match ≠ cryptographic response integrityValidated alternative issuer: extra iss MAY be omittedJARM / authorization-endpoint ID Token have more checks
03
Do not mistake a plain issuer parameter for a signature.

The ordinary response parameter is readable and unsigned. Correct issuer correlation is distinct from cryptographic integrity. A suitable validated JARM response or authorization-endpoint ID Token can supply the issuer by other means, with their additional checks.

Source for this drawing: RFC 9207 · Read RFC section 4 ↗

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New to this? Start hereA quick picture + helpful background

A key is different from permission.

An app, a person, and a server have different roles. Follow who asks, who grants permission, and who checks the credential. A key in the drawing is an analogy, not a literal protocol field.

Helpful first, if these ideas are unfamiliar

These pictures are analogies to help you learn. The linked RFC explains the actual rules.

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KEY POINT

Issuer correlation, response integrity and user authentication solve different problems.

  • Clients MUST NOT allow several authorization servers to share the same issuer identifier. Manually configured accepted issuer values MUST be unique for each server.
  • If an authorization response also returns an OpenID Connect ID Token from the authorization endpoint, its iss claim MUST equal the iss parameter. Clients MUST reject multiple issuer identifiers that disagree.
  • When an issuer is already conveyed and checked by a suitable alternative, such as an authorization-endpoint ID Token or JARM, the extra iss parameter MAY be omitted. JARM is a JWT response envelope; its issuer must still be validated. Full alternative-mode processing is outside this guide.
  • The plain iss parameter is not cryptographically protected against tampering. It counters mix-up under the described model; it does not make a response signed, encrypted or fully trustworthy. TLS and the rest of OAuth security still matter.
DETAILS

A token-endpoint-only ID Token arrives too late to replace this authorization-response check. No real ID Token, JARM signature, client credential or account is used here.

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