Metadata, TLS & CORS
07Discover the right endpoints, protect the channel, and distinguish browser redirects from cross-origin API calls.
Related RFCs and changes
“Updates” changes part of an earlier RFC. “Obsoletes” replaces it. This list shows selected related documents.
DIAGRAM§ 2.6 ↗
RFC 9700 · § 2.6EXAMPLE
4 / 4
04
Protect the resource request.
Use authenticated, encrypted communication to the resource server.
Protocol participantThreat or exceptionProtocol controlSimplified drawings · precise section references
RFC 6749 § 1.6RFC 8996 § 1.1 + RFC 9700 § 2.6
RFC 8996 replaces older TLS minimums with TLS 1.2 and prohibits old-version fallback. RFC 9700 also recommends metadata use and end-to-end TLS under BCP 195.
Read the updated RFC section ↗Configure securely. Transport securely.
- Publishing and using authorization-server metadata is RECOMMENDED, including support detection for PKCE.
- Authorization responses MUST NOT use unencrypted connections; native loopback redirects are the HTTP exception. End-to-end TLS is RECOMMENDED.
- CORS MAY support browser-accessed token, metadata, JWKS, and registration endpoints. It MUST NOT be enabled at the authorization endpoint.
Metadata helps avoid endpoint mistakes and supports key rotation and cryptographic agility. It is not a replacement for validating issuer and destination. Proxy and postMessage boundaries get their own chapters.
Read the RFC section ↗Diagrams simplify the RFC. Read the linked sections for complete requirements.
PrivacyAll chapters in this RFC
- OAuth overview
- Authorization code + PKCE
- Retire unsafe grants
- Prevent token replay
- Limit token privileges
- Authenticate the client
- Metadata, TLS & CORS
- The attacker model
- Redirect URI validation
- Referer header leakage
- Browser history leakage
- Authorization server mix-up
- Authorization code injection
- Access token injection
- Cross-site request forgery
- PKCE downgrade
- Leakage at resource servers
- Misuse of stolen tokens
- Open redirection
- 307 credential forwarding
- TLS termination & proxies
- Refresh token protection
- Client as resource owner
- Clickjacking
- In-browser messaging