Combine successful STARTTLS and AUTH without guessing
03STARTTLS begins Transport Layer Security (TLS) negotiation on an SMTP connection. The S suffix records it successfully providing a strong transport encryption layer; adding successful AUTH yields ESMTPSA.
A separate final example has strong STARTTLS protection and successful AUTH in the current SMTP state. The combined type is ESMTPSA, not an invented ESMTPAS token.
Source for this drawing: RFC 3848 · Read RFC section 1 ↗
New to this? Start hereA quick picture + helpful background
A message needs an address.
Think of a packet as a small addressed envelope. Devices pass it onward; transport protocols decide what delivery promises an application gets.
Helpful first, if these ideas are unfamiliar
These pictures are analogies to help you learn. The linked RFC explains the actual rules.
Terms in this drawing
Related RFCs and changes
“Updates” changes part of an earlier RFC. “Obsoletes” replaces it. This list shows selected related documents.
The two suffix properties are separate observations of this hop.
- ESMTPS records successful STARTTLS providing the strong transport encryption layer; a 220 ready reply alone is not the completed negotiation.
- ESMTPSA combines ESMTPS and ESMTPA. Its name does not mandate a universal ordering of TLS and AUTH; the scenes compare final properties.
- RFC 3207 §4.2 resets pre-TLS SMTP knowledge. A successful AUTH seen only before that reset is not carried forward into the new TLS SMTP state.
- The label omits TLS version, cipher and certificate-validation details. It is not modern TLS configuration advice or proof of end-to-end encryption.
The drawings compare outcomes, not one continuous AUTH/TLS transcript.
Read the RFC section ↗