Use traces for diagnosis, not automatic trust
05Mail can carry several Received fields written by different systems. A readable ESMTPSA token is only a claim about a hop; the header itself does not authenticate the claim.
An operator compares the claimed relay and event with that relay’s logs. This can improve diagnosis; the keyword alone still reveals neither TLS specifics nor a verified message author.
Source for this drawing: RFC 3848 · Read RFC section 3 ↗
New to this? Start hereA quick picture + helpful background
A message needs an address.
Think of a packet as a small addressed envelope. Devices pass it onward; transport protocols decide what delivery promises an application gets.
Helpful first, if these ideas are unfamiliar
These pictures are analogies to help you learn. The linked RFC explains the actual rules.
Terms in this drawing
Related RFCs and changes
“Updates” changes part of an earlier RFC. “Obsoletes” replaces it. This list shows selected related documents.
Correlate trace claims with the relevant mail-server logs.
- RFC 3848 §3 says these keywords are not normally protected in transport and can be modified by an active attacker. They reveal no security-mechanism specifics and provide no real-world security assurance.
- The text advises against using the keywords for filtering or relaying decisions except in very controlled environments. This is source guidance, not an invented uppercase MUST/SHOULD requirement.
- Higher reliability comes from correlating Received headers with the logs of the mail transfer agents that handled the message. A diagrammed correlation is supporting evidence, not a cryptographic proof.
- Preserve useful traces for later diagnosis. RFC 5321 §7.6 also cautions that trace names and optional FOR information can disclose details; this guide does not change logging, retention or privacy policy.
A suffix does not verify the message author, certify every relay, or make a message safe.
Read the RFC section ↗